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TARGETING CONDUCT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
METHOD OF PENALIZING HATE CRIMES
I. Introduction
On October 7, 1989,Todd Mitchell and nine other black men and
boys gathered outside of an apartment complex in Kenosha,
Wisconsin.1 They discussed a racially charged movie in which a
white man beat a black boy, and their emotions stirred into anger.2
Mitchell incited his friends further, asking " '[d]o you all feel hyped
up to move on some white people?'; " 3 Minutes later, Gregory
Reddick, a fourteen-year-old white male, walked by the group and
became the focus of its wrath.4 Mitchell spurred the pack, pointing
them toward Reddick and saying: "'You all want to f[-] somebody
up? There goes a white boy; go get him.' "" The group attacked
Reddick, beat him severely, and left him unconscious.6 Reddick was
in a coma for four days and suffered possibly permanent brain
damage.7
Hate crimes such as this occur with greater frequency each year.'
Just recently, three white men robbed Christopher Wilson, a black
man. They doused him with gasoline, and set him on fire.' During
the assault, which left Wilson with bums covering forty percent of his
body, the attackers shouted racial slurs. 10 A note found at the scene
of the burning read " 'One les [sic] nigger, more to go. KKK.' ,,
While the local Ku Klux Klan denied any affiliation with the assail-
ants, 1 2 the Grand Wizard assured America that the Klan is not above
committing racial violence: "'That's not our style.... [A]n ass whip-
1. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431
(U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431
(U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Common Questions About Hate Crimes, KLANWATCH: INTELLIGENCE REP.
(Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala.), Feb. 1992, at 6 (stating that 1991
was the fourth year in a row in which hate crime increased).
9. 3 Whites Charged in Burning of a Black, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1993, at A13.
10. Id.
11. Suspects Can't Be Charged Under Hate Statute, UPI, Jan. 8, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
12. See id.
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ping is one thing, but burning or killing is another.' a13
Violence committed because of bias against a victim's religion, race,
sexual orientation, gender, or other human characteristic,' 4 affects
more than just the immediate victim. Hate crimes also injure mem-
bers of the victims' groups, and society as a whole.' 5 The rate at
which such crimes are being committed, coupled with the societal in-
jury effected, has prompted states and municipalities to devise a vari-
ety of legislation dealing with the problem of bias crimes.1 6 Recently,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized the compelling na-
ture of the states' interest in controlling racial and other bias-moti-
vated crimes. 17
Forty-six states have enacted hate-crime statutes - criminal stat-
utes that seek to punish bias-motivated violence."8 These laws gener-
ally fall into one of two classes, either hate-speech or penalty-
enhancement statutes. The former has sought to control virulent ex-
pression by punishing the utterance or display of words or symbols
that the user knows will arouse anger in others on the basis of race,
color, religion, gender, or some other immutable characteristic.' 9 The
United States Supreme Court examined an ordinance of this type in
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,20 and found that the law infringed on the
First Amendment right to free speech.2'
Penalty-enhancement hate-crime statutes vary slightly among
states, but they generally allow for longer sentences and higher fines
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Hate Crimes Statutes: A 1991 Status Report, ADL LAW REPORT (Anti-Defa-
mation League of B'nai B'rith, New York, N.Y.), 1991, app. B at 22-23 [hereinafter ADL
LAW REPORT] (explaining categories protected by each state's hate-crime statute); Abra-
ham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Call for Alternative Responses, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
875, 879-80 (1992).
15. See Susan Gellman, Sticks And Stones Can Put You In Jail, But Can Words In-
crease Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,
39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 340 (1991).
16. "[T]hese statutes are the reflection of legislatures' recognition that these harms
are real and significant." Id.
17. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992); id. at 2554 (White, J.,
dissenting).
18. ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 14, app. A at 21. Thirty-two states have laws
similar to the model statute devised by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Id.
The ADL model is printed infra, note 71. Fourteen other states have enacted some form
of hate-crime legislation. ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. Hate-crime statutes typically list several
protected categories; however, state laws vary with regard to which categories should
receive protected status. For the sake of simplicity, this Note will use race to represent all
protected categories. The specific racial category of blacks similarly shall represent all
hate-crime victims.
20. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
21. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; infra part II.A.
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when specified crimes are committed because of the victim's race.22
In State v. Mitchell,23 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
State's penalty-enhancement statute violated the First Amendment
right to free speech.24 The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari and will soon consider the issues presented in Mitchell.25
Part II of this Note will analyze the Supreme Court's holding in
R.A. V and the state court's holding in Mitchell. Although the hate-
speech ordinance in R.A. V differs materially from those focused upon
in this Note - penalty-enhancement statutes-an understanding of
R.A. V is necessary because the holding provides the backdrop against
which other hate-crime laws will be considered. Part III of this Note
argues that the Mitchell rationale is flawed, not only in its attempt to
distinguish federal anti-discrimination laws, but also in its effort to
invoke a civil/criminal-penalty distinction. Part IV concludes by of-
fering a sample penalty-enhancement statute that, in conformity with
the Supreme Court's holding in R.A. V, should permit states to punish
hate crimes.
II. First Amendment Attacks on Hate-Crime Legislation
A. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul: Hate-Speech Laws Held
Unconstitutional
R.A. V reversed a Minnesota Supreme Court decision that upheld a
22. See, e.g., infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
23. 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992)
(No. 92-515).
24. Id.; infra part II.B. One other court has invalidated a penalty-enhancement stat-
ute on constitutional grounds. State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ohio 1992). Be-
cause of the similarities of arguments used in Wyant and Mitchell, this Note primarily
addresses Mitchell.
Penalty-enhancement statutes have been held constitutional as well. See, e.g., Dobbins
v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 925-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted, No. 80,580,
1992 Fla. LEXIS 2242 (Fla. Dec. 23, 1992); State v. Plowman, 383 P.2d 558, 565-66 (Or.
1992); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 820 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988).
Dobbins held that Florida's statute did not punish opinion, and that even if it did regu-
late the content of speech, it is "narrowly tailored to serve [a] compelling state interest"
and is therefore justified. Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 925. For further discussion of Dobbins,
see infra notes 94, 191.
Plowman distinguished its holding from Mitchell because Oregon's statute contained a
requirement that two or more people act together. Plowman, 838 P.2d at 565. The Ore-
gon court held that the statute did not contravene the First Amendment because it
targeted conduct rather than expression. Id.; infra notes 94, 147, 149.
Grupe rejected a First Amendment challenge to a New York statute by stating that the
law regulated conduct. Grupe 532 N.Y.S.2d at 818. For further discussion of Grupe, see
infra notes 94, 147.
25. 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515).
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hate speech ordinance enacted by the City of St. Paul.26 The ordi-
nance prohibited the display of symbols that one should reasonably
know would cause anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 27 R.A.V., a juvenile, chal-
lenged the law when he was tried for burning a cross in the yard of a
black family.28
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, 29 ruling that
it proscribed only "fighting words". within the meaning of Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire.a0 In Chaplinsky, the United States Supreme Court
defined "fighting words" as words or conduct that "inflictf injury or
tendfl to incite immediate violence."'" Chaplinsky declared that fight-
ing words are not protected by the First Amendment.32 Limiting the
impact of St. Paul's ordinance to fighting words, the Minnesota court
concluded that, the law did not infringe on First Amendment rights.3a
R.A.V. appealed, and certiorari was granted.
The United States Supreme Court analyzed prior First Amendment
decisions and concluded that the ordinance was impermissibly con-
tent-based. a4 While recognizing that fighting words lie beyond the
protection offered by the Constitution, the majority held that prior
free speech cases .limit a state's ability to -control proscribable
speech.3- The Court emphasized that "[t]he government may not reg-
ulate use based on hostility --- of favoritism - toward the underlying
message expressed."' a6 In light of this prohibition, a state's attempt to
restrict only a sub-category of fighting words cannot hinge upon the
26. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.'2538, 2541-42 (1992).
27. The statute provided as follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 2541.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
34. Id. at 2542. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens concurred in the
judgment on the grounds that.the ordinance was overbroad: "[l]t criminalizes not only
unprotected expression but expression protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 2550
(White, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 2545. The Court was constrained to use the state court's interpretation,
which limited the ordinance's effect to fighting words. Id. at 2542.
36. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
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content of the speech.37
St. Paul's ordinance was problematic because it did not prohibit all
fighting words; instead, it prohibited only expressions that amount to
"'fighting words' that provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.' ",38 Other vicious and abusive forms of ex-
pression were permitted as long as they eschewed the specified disfa-
vored topics. 39 Thus, in the Court's view, the ban affected speech
solely on the basis of the ideas conveyed.' This attempt to control
the content and viewpoint of expression4 infringed upon the right to
free speech.42
The Court stated that, in some instances, unprotected speech may
be constitutionally sub-categorized. 3 Writing, for the majority,
Justice Scalia outlined three sub-classifications that a state could
ban." The first involves dividing the unprotected category into de-
grees of severity. Thus, categorizations are permitted if they can be
described in terms that justify proscription of the entire class of
speech at issue. 5 Under this standard, fighting words that are more
likely to result in violence may be condemned so long as the sub-
category is described by the probability of causing violence and not by
the content of the speech.
Second, states may ban a class of unprotected speech if the goal is
to regulate the "secondary effects" of the speech.46 To be constitu-
tional, however, these laws cannot single Out a sub-category based on
its content or expressive elements.47 For example, a state's interests in
the welfare of children would allow it to prohibit obscene live per-
formances involving minors, even if the state otherwise permitted
adults to give such performances.4" In this hypothetical, obscene ex-
pression constitutes the entire category of unprotected speech, and the
expression involving minors constitutes the class of obscene speech
37. See id. at 2542.
38. Id. at 2547.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 2542.
41. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
42. Id. at 2542.
43. See id. at 2545.
44. See id.
45. Id. For example, obscenity is a category of unprotected speech; therefore, "[a]
State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in
its prurience .... But it may not prohibit ... only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages." Id. at 2546.
46. See R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
47. See id.
48. See id.
1993]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
that the state may ban. Providing another example, Justice Scalia ex-
plained that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 ("Title VII")
targets conduct and proscribes a sub-category of fighting words.50 Be-
cause Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination, it proscribes the
use of sexually derogatory fighting words (a sub-category of fighting
words), at least to the extent that such expressions could be used to
prove discrimination.5" While the purpose of Title VII is to regulate
conduct, it has a constitutionally permissible impact on expression.52
The Court broadly described the third permissible classification.
Statutes may make distinctions based on content if there "is no realis-
tic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."5 " As an ex-
ample, the Court stated that no First Amendment interests would be
infringed by a statute prohibiting obscenity involving blue-eyed ac-
tresses.54 In short, all three tests emphasize concern over the state
control of expressive content.
The Court held that the St. Paul ordinance made a non-neutral
content-based distinction; the law prohibited a sub-category of fight-
ing words considered offensive solely because of a person's race.55 It
further found that none of the three exceptions could save the ordi-
nance. 56 Although St. Paul had urged that the intent behind the ordi-
nance was to protect against the secondary effects of hate speech -
the victimization of particularly vulnerable groups57 - the Court
stated that the " 'emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect." "58 The Court acknowledged the compelling state
interest in controlling hate crimes,59 but underscored the existence of
content-neutral alternatives. 6° The "'danger of censorship' ",61 neces-
sitated a finding of First Amendment infringement.62
49. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
50. See R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (distinguishing Title VII from statutes aimed at
controlling content of expression).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 2546-47.
53. Id. at 2547.
54. See id.
55. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 2549.
58. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
59. Id.; see also id. at 2554 (White, J., dissenting).
60. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
61. Id. at 2549 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991)).
62. See id. at 2550.
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B. State v. Mitchell: Penalty-Enhancement Held Unconstitutional
In State v. Mitchell,63 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin heard a
challenge to a penalty-enhancing hate-crime statute. Mitchell had
been convicted under Wisconsin's hate-crime statute for attacking a
fourteen-year-old white male.6 Mitchell instigated the incident by di-
recting a group of about ten African-Americans toward the victim.65
The band beat the victim severely, stole his tennis shoes, and left him
with possible permanent brain damage.66 A jury convicted Mitchell
of aggravated battery and found that he had violated the hate-crime
statute.67 The enhanced penalty provision of the statute enabled the
court to sentence Mitchell to four years rather than to the maximum
sentence of two years for aggravated battery. 8 Mitchell challenged
the constitutionality of the penalty-enhancement statute.69
At the time of Mitchell's conviction, Wisconsin's hate-crime statute
provided as follows:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the un-
derlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2): 7°
(a) Commits a crime under [the criminal code] ...
(b) Intentionally selects the [victim] or selects the property which
is damaged . .. by the crime under par. (a) because of the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or an-
cestry of [the victim] or the owner or occupant of that property.71
63. 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992)
(No. 92-515).
64. See id. at 809; supra part I.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809.
69. See id. at 809-10.
70. Subparagraph (2) provided revised maximum fines and periods of imprisonment
for the crime. The penalties were higher than those for the underlying crime. See Wis.
STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90).
71. Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90) (emphasis added). The Wisconsin statute is
based on the ADL model intimidation statute. ADL LAW REPORT, supra note 14, app.
B at 23. The ADL model provides:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another
individual or group of individuals, he violates Section of the Penal
Code (insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harass-
ment, menacing, assault and/or other appropriate statutorily proscribed crimi-
nal conduct).
B. Intimidation is a misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the crimi-
nal liability should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for
commission of the offense).
Id. at 4.
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The State Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds, stating that the law directly and indirectly en-
croached on the right to free speech.72
According to Mitchell, Wisconsin's statute directly violated First
Amendment rights because it punished an accused's biased thought.73
The court stated that, as thoughts and speech are equally protected by
the First Amendment,74 any infringement on the right to free thought
violates constitutional rights." The penalty-enhancement statute's
defect was found in its phrase referring to the selection of a victim
because of race.76 The opinion stated that every intentional crime in-
volves the selection of a victim.77 Thus, the court reasoned, an "ex-
amination of the intentional 'selection' of a victim necessarily requires
a subjective examination of the actor's motive or reason for singling
out [the victim]." 7 The opinion cited R.A. V in support of its holding
and stated that the expression proscribed by Wisconsin's statute was
"identical to that targeted by the St. Paul ordinance - racial or other
discriminatory animus."7 9 The Mitchell court concluded that the law
infringed upon First Amendment rights because it punished the de-
fendant's motive8 ' rather than the conduct of selecting the victim.8,
Mitchell also held that the statute indirectly infringed upon First
Amendment rights because it had a chilling effect on free speech 2 _
the law was overbroad and threatened to punish an individual's
words.83 Citing previous Wisconsin court interpretations of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the court defined an overbroad statute as one that
has language "so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied to consti-
tutionally protected conduct which the state is not permitted to regu-
72. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1992) (No. 92-515).
73. See id. at 811.
74. See id. at 811 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)
and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812.
78. Id. at 813 (emphasis added). The court cites Gellman, supra note 15, at 363, to
support the argument that the statute punishes only the defendant's bigoted thought.
Professor Gellman argues that, because the underlying crime is already punishable, the
enhanced penalty punishes only the actor's reasons for acting. See id.
79. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d at 815.
80. Id. at 812. Mitchell also stated that the statute "enhance[d] the punishment of
bigoted criminals because they are bigoted." Id. at 814; see also id. at 817 (reiterating the
view that the statute criminalized subjective bigoted thought).
81. Id. at 812-13. The court in State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453-59 (Ohio 1992)
reached the same conclusion by applying an identical analysis.
82. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 815.
83. Id.
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late."84 By including otherwise permissible conduct in their scope,
overbroad laws tend to deter persons from exercising constitutionally
protected freedoms.8 5
As applied, the hate-crime statute allowed speech to be used cir-
cumstantially to prove that the defendant intentionally selected the
victim because of the victim's race.8 6 The use of words in this man-
ner, the court held, would penalize protected expression and would
chill free speech. 7 As an example, the court stated, "if A strikes B in
the face he commits a criminal battery [a misdemeanor]. However,
should A add a word such as 'nigger,' 'honkey,' 'jew,' 'mick,' 'kraut,'
'spic,' or 'queer,' the crime becomes a felony, and A will be punished
not for his conduct alone ... but for using the spoken word."88
The Mitchell court also stated that the chilling effect would stretch
so far as to prevent people from expressing their views for fear of
prosecution under the statute in the future.8 9 Should a person commit
an intentional crime against someone of a different race, "'any books
ever read, speakers ever listened to, or associations ever held could be
introduced as evidence that [the accused] held racist views and was
acting upon them at the time of the offense.' ,9 Therefore, citizens
would begin to censor their expressions so that their views would not
subject them to enhanced penalties in the future.9' The court empha-
sized that because the chilling effect would occur before any crime has
been committed, the State could not argue that citizens "need only
refrain from committing one of the underlying offenses to avoid the
thought punishment. ' 92 In the court's view, the chilling effect per-
vaded the system at all times.93 As a result of this "universal chilling
effect," the statute was found to be unconstitutionally overbroad. 94
84. Id. (quoting Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis. 1987)).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 815-16.
87. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816.
88. Id.; see also Wis. STAT. § 940.19(1) (1991) (defining criminal battery).
89. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816.
90. Id. (quoting Gellman, supra note 15, at 360-61).
91. See id. (quoting Gellman, supra note 15, at 360-61).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. Because the court held the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds, the court did not discuss Mitchell's other challenges to the statute. See id. at
825 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Bablitch applied the common meaning
to each word of the statute and rejected Mitchell's claims that it was unconstitutionally
vague. See id. at 825-29. Similar statutes have also survived vagueness challenges. See,
e.g., Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 925-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted,
No. 80,580, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 2242 (Fla. Dec. 23, 1992); State v. Plowman, 383 P.2d 558,
565-66 (Or. 1992). Justice Bablitch also addressed the claim that the statute violates the
19931
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III. Penalty-Enhancement Hate-Crime Statutes: Debunking the
Thought-Punishment Theory
Penalty-enhancement hate-crime statutes punish criminal conduct,
not speech or thought. Therefore, a carefully drafted statute should
survive First Amendment scrutiny. This Part begins by discussing
criminal conduct in general. Concentrating on other statutes that en-
hance punishment for certain crimes, this Part shows how hate-crime
statutes fit within the framework of the criminal justice system. This
Part concludes that Mitchell was wrongly decided and that penalty-
enhancing statutes, in consonance with First Amendment freedoms,
regulate conduct.
A. What Is Criminal Conduct?
The act of killing someone is not punishable if, for example, it is
done in self-defense95 or while unconscious.96 The outcome of one's
act does not always determine the punishment. Criminal law is also
concerned with the actor's culpability, as the goal is to punish the
"blameworthiness entailed. in choosing to commit a criminal
wrong." 97 Blameworthiness within the context of criminal law fo-
cuses on "the level of intentionality with which the defendant acted
... with what the defendant intended, knew, or should have known
when he acted."9 In short, criminal laws penalize the combination of
a "criminal" mentality (mens rea) and a "criminal" act (actus reus).99
For the same reason that acts are not punishable without a culpable
mentality, certain mens rea are considered less blameworthy than
others."° For example, criminal laws distinguish between reckless
and intentional actions, viewing intent as being more culpable than
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and concluded that the law did not violate that clause. See id. at 829-31. Furthermore, a
New York court has concluded that such laws do not contravene the equal protection
clause. People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 820-21 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988).
95. Section 35.05 of the New York Penal Law provides that "conduct which would
otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when: ... 2. Such conduct
is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury
which is about to occur; .... ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1987) (emphasis
added).
96. Somnambulism, the commission of acts while in an unconscious state, provides a
defense to criminal charges. See, e.g., People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970).
97. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (5th ed. 1989).
98. Id.
99. "Criminal" thoughts cannot be punished without a criminal act. KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 196-98.
100. One purpose of New York penal law is "[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds
[Vol. XX
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recklessness. 10 1 A comparison of manslaughter and murder statutes
best exemplifies this concept of blameworthiness.' 0 2 If Ann stabs Bob
in the chest with a knife and kills him, her punishment would depend
upon her intent at the time she committed the act. If she selected the
knife from a stage prop table and thought it was probably incapable of
causing injury, she acted recklessly. Therefore, she would be guilty of
manslaughter. 103 If, however, she actually intended to drive the knife
into Bob's heart, she has committed murder. 1°4 Murder carries a
more severe punishment than manslaughter. 105 The act remains the
same, but the actor's conduct is more blameworthy. Thus, punish-
ment is meted out in proportion to the moral wrongness of the
conduct. 106
Specific intent crimes, such as burglary, 10 7 further illustrate how
society seeks to punish "blameworthiness." New York defines bur-
glary as entering a building - the crime of criminal trespass ' 1 -
with the intent to commit a crime inside. 19 If, for example, Bob is
between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor; ......
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1987) (emphasis added).
101. New York, for example, differentiates between acting intentionally (actor's con-
scious objective is to cause the result or to engage in the conduct), knowingly (actor is
aware that his conduct is of a certain nature or that certain: circumstances exist), reck-
lessly (actor is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk),
and with criminal negligence (actor fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1987).
102. New York defines manslaughter in the second degree as recklessly causing the
death of another. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987). Murder in the second
degree requires that the defendant intended to cause the death of another and so caused
that death. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987).
103. See supra note 102.
104. Id.
105. In New York, second-degree manslaughter is a class C felony carrying a maxi-
mum sentence of fifteen years. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1987). Second-
degree murder is a class A-I felony, carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Id.
106. The Wisconsin court's analysis, however, leads to the conclusion that a murder
conviction would unconstitutionally punish thoughts. Ann acted intentionally with re-
spect to her hand whether the result was reckless or intentional. The result is the same in
either case - she stabbed Bob in the chest. Furthermore, the effect on the victim is the
same. Because the underlying act of stabbing Bob is already penalized by the manslaugh-
ter statute, the only thing being punished is Ann's thoughts, her desire to kill Bob. The
First Amendment protects thoughts, therefore this proportionality of punishment should
be unconstitutional.
Such sophism overlooks society's interest in punishing individuals. States penalize and
grade moral blameworthiness - the willingness of the actor to step outside of the rules.
107. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 1988) (defining third-degree
burglary).
108. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1988).
109. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 1988).
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caught immediately after breaking into Ann's store, Bob's punish-
ment will depend upon whether he merely intended to enter, or
whether he intended to commit a criminal act once inside. In either
case, however, Bob's act remains the same (he broke into a store), and
with respect to that act, his mentality was the same (he did it inten-
tionally). Bob's punishment, nonetheless, hinges upon his further
motive. 110
Assume Bob entered the store because he wanted to steal money. If
convicted of burglary, Bob may complain that he is being punished
for a crime he did not commit. His only physical act was that of
entering the premises. If he had not wanted Ann's money, he could
not be convicted of burglary. The statute punishes him because of his
motive for entering the building, and thus punishes his thoughts. Can
it seriously be argued that burglary statutes are unconstitutional be-
cause they regulate thoughts?
Such reasoning errs because it ignores the purposes of the criminal
law. One goal is to punish blameworthiness."' Other purposes -
deterrence,' 12 rehabilitation, and restraint"' - concern the future
110. Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1988). Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 1988).
111. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. New York penal law states that
one of its purposes is "[t]o provide for an appropriate public response to particular of-
fenses, including consideration of the consequences of the offense for the victim, including
the victim's family, and the community; . . . ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney
1987) (emphasis added). This is generally termed the retributive theory of punishment.
See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 137-48. The retributive theory regards
punishment as a means to offset the harm done to society by the crime. See HERBERT
MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976), reprinted in KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 138, 139. Persons who act criminally have all the bene-
fits of the system, but they have avoided the societal burden of self-restraint. Id. "Jus-
tice-that is punishing [individuals who violate the rules]-restores the equilibrium of
benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the
debt." Id.
For further discussion of the retributive theory as a justification of penalty-enhance-
ment laws, see James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation:
Where's the Speech? 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 6, 8-10 (1992). Professor Weinstein points
out, for example, that it would not be considered unusual "if a judge gave a defendant
who killed his rich uncle in order to inherit his fortune a more severe sentence than a
nephew who killed his uncle to save him further suffering from a painfully debilitating
disease." Id. at 8.
112. The deterrence theory of punishment recognizes that people balance the costs and
benefits of their actions. Persons whose conduct is guided by laws will weigh the ex-
pected punishment against the perceived profits of the planned conduct. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, 1 J. BENTHAM'S WORKS, Part II, Bk. 1, at 399-402
(J. Browning ed., 1843), reprinted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 328. The
profit of the crime means "every advantage, real or apparent, which has operated as a
motive to the commission of the crime." Id. (emphasis added). Persons who see the
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acts of individuals. Penalizing the combined act and intent will deter
future crimes. It subjects to state control those persons who display a
willingness to violate the law, and it permits attempts to rehabilitate
those individuals.l"4 If Bob's sophistry were allowed to prevail, how-
ever, all criminal attempt statutes and all gradations between levels of
culpability would necessarily fall, as they depend on the actor's
motive. "15
I The Wisconsin Supreme Court struggled unsuccessfully to distin-
guish motive from intent.'1 6 This distinction became necessary only
because the court concluded that motive cannot be punished, nor can
it be an element of an offense. 17 However, as Glanville Williams has
observed, "[a]lthough the verbal distinction between 'intention' and
'motive' is convenient, it must be realized that the remoter intention
called motive is still an intention."'18
benefits as outweighing the detriment will violate the laws. See id. To deter crimes,
therefore, punishment must be meted out in greater degrees as the perceived benefit in-
creases. See id.
113. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1987). The law states that its
purposes are: "To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those
convicted, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1987) (emphasis added).
114. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1987).
115. Because one act receives different treatment if it results from negligence rather
than intent, a defendant convicted of an intentional crime could argue that he or she is
being punished for motive - because of desiring the outcome.
116. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 813 n.ll (Wis.), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515); see also Gellman, supra note 15, at
364-65 (laying the foundation on which Mitchell built).
117. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 813 & n.Il (quoting Gellman, supra note 15 at 364).
118. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 10, 14 (1965), re-
printed in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 227. LaFave and Scott state that
"intent relates to the means and motive to the ends, but that where the end is the means
to yet another end, then the medial end may also be considered in terms of intent."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6(a), at 228 (2d ed.
1986) (emphasis added); Gellman, supra note 15, at 364 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT
supra). LaFave and Scott also state "the notion that motive is immaterial in the substan-
tive criminal law is wrong, for there are a number of instances in which the inquiry into
why an act was committed is crucial in determining whether or not the defendant has
committed a given crime." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra § 3.6(a), at 227; Eric J. Grannis,
Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhance-
ment for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 189-90 (1993) (quoting LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra) (examining the Mitchell court's attempt to distinguish motive from intent).
In the case of burglary, for example, the actor intended the act of entering the store
(criminal trespass). His reason for entering the store was to take money; yet the law
deems this reason an intent. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing
specific intent statutes). Therefore, when the Mitchell court states that "[c]riminal law is
not concerned with a person's reasons for committing crimes, but rather with the actor's
intent or purpose in doing so," 485 N.W.2d at 813 n. 11, the court misstates the issue.
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B. Taking the "Hate" Out of Hate-Crime Statutes
An analysis of the elements of Wisconsin's hate-crime statute
reveals that it punishes conduct, not thoughts. Therefore, the law
does not infringe upon First Amendment rights. The first analytical
step is to define the actus reus. Under Wisconsin's approach, the pen-
alty-enhancement statute employs the actus reus of the underlying
criminal statute. For example, Wisconsin's battery statute defines the
actus reus as the act of causing bodily harm.' 9 In Mitchell, the State
proved that the defendant indeed caused bodily harm to his victim.
Yet this was insufficient to convict him; his mens rea had to be
proven. 120
The underlying criminal statute, battery, defines the applicable
mens rea-intent.'2 1 Mitchell acted intentionally when causing the
injury; therefore he is guilty of battery. Evidence of this mens rea,
however, was not in itself enough to convict the defendant of a hate
crime. The jury had to find that Mitchell had selected his victim on
the basis of race; this element of selection represents a mens rea of
intent.
Although not everyone who intentionally injures someone of a dif-
ferent race should be guilty of a hate crime, Mitchell's conduct re-
vealed more than an intent to injure. Mitchell intended to injure a
white person - any white person. He did not act regardless of the
victim's race, but rather because he could achieve his goal only by
attacking someone of that race. The hate-crime statute punishes this
particular intent to injure a victim on the basis of race. 122 Mitchell
119. WIS. STAT. § 940.19(1) (1991). The law states: "Whoever causes bodily harm to
another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another with-
out the consent of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." Id. Bodily
harm is defined as "physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condi-
tion." WiS. STAT. § 939.22(4) (1991).
120. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
121. WIS. STAT. § 940.19(1) (1991).
122. Professor Gellman notes "it can be argued that the presence of the bias motive
changes the qualitative character of the underlying crime so drastically that it becomes an
entirely different act." Gellman, supra note 15, at 357. She further states that "if ... the
sum of the act plus the motive is greater than its parts, that 'sum' is not defined by the
statute, and the statute is unconstitutionally vague." Id. However, this statement is no
more true in hate crimes than in other crimes. Indeed, Gellman appears content with the
situation as it applies to burglary. She states:
[C]hanging the purpose of the break-in changes the very nature of the act: if A
broke into B's house for the purpose of getting A's own property ... the act...
is simply ... trespass, not burglary .... By contrast, .. . [if A's] purpose was that
of committing the crime of theft in B's house ... it is ... burglary.
Id. at 365. Although Professor Gellman does not explain why the crime changes from
trespass to burglary, she is correct. The crime changes because the legislature has so
defined it. Moreover, her reasoning applies equally to hate crimes.
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was proved to have that intent; attacking his victim was only a medial
end to obtaining his intended goal.123 In order to penalize a crime
involving this intent, the mens rea must be defined by the statute.
Wisconsin's legislature accomplished this task by requiring proof that
the defendant acted because of the victim's race.1 24
Federal criminal statutes also penalize acts committed because of
race. For example, Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968125 (the
"1968 Act") prescribes imprisonment as a penalty for willfully injur-
ing or intimidating any person because of race and because she has
been travelling in interstate commerce.1 26 Although the statute pro-
tects rights that would otherwise be unprotected under federal crimi-
nal law, it does so only if the victim has been selected on the basis of
race. 127
No court has considered First Amendment challenges to the 1968
123. For a discussion of the relationship between intent and motive, see supra note 118
and accompanying text. Notably, Mitchell achieved his medial end and final end in the
same motion. This, however, is not problematic. In burglary, for example, a person can
achieve the medial and final end in one action by shooting through a window to injure a
victim or by throwing a torch into a building. Once the instrument of the crime crosses
the threshold, the act of entering is complete; therefore, the actor is guilty of burglary.
See, e.g., People v. Tragni, 449 N.Y.S.2d 923, 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
124. See supra part II.B. Of course, if the statute prohibited the intent to injure blacks
only, the law might violate the equal protection requirements of the Federal Constitution.
Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents discrimination on the basis of race). To
avoid such a conflict, the proposed law prohibits the intent to injure every racial group; it
does this by defining the intent as selecting because of race. This encompasses all possible
races that an actor might intend to injure, thereby surviving equal protection scrutiny.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1988).
126. See id. (emphasis added). The statute states in pertinent part:
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law .... willfully injures,
intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere
with-
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because
he is or has been-
(E) travelling in or using any facility of interstate commerce...
(F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any inn, hotel, [or] motel ...
shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
Id.
127. The statute requires proof that the accused intended to interfere with the specified
rights (that the defendant attacked because the victim was travelling in interstate com-
merce). Yet, this is no different than burglary laws, which punish the intent to commit a
crime once inside a building, ,nor is it distinguishable from hate-crime statutes, which
proscribe the intent to injure because of race. All stated intents are elements of the crime.
Even though the 1968 Act combines two intentions, each must be proven to convict a
defendant.
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Act, but the Tenth Circuit has described the law as requiring more
than proof of biased opinions. 128 In United States v. Franklin,129 the
defendant was convicted under the 1968 Act for killing two black per-
sons. On appeal, he claimed that his pre-trial stipulation admitting a
hatred of blacks should have precluded the prosecution from intro-
ducing evidence of his racial motivation to commit the murders.13 0
The court held that, although the defendant had admitted his racism,
intent was an element of the crime, and therefore the government had
to prove that Franklin had carried out an intention to kill his victims
because they were black. 131 Thus, the Tenth Circuit implicitly recog-
nized that the law was aimed not at beliefs, but at the intent to injure
because of race. The 1968 Act and the similarly predicated hate-
crime statutes 3 2 should survive constitutional scrutiny.1 3
3
The Mitchell court's conclusion that Wisconsin's statute "enhances
the punishment of bigoted criminals because they are bigoted"'134 is
based on false assumptions. Only criminals who act because of race
will be punished by the statute. A bigot may attack an African-
American in order to steal money; a racially-indifferent person may
attack an African-American solely to impress her racist friends.1 35
The latter actor has violated the statute; the former, though bigoted,
has not. One's attitudes toward African-Americans are not at is-
sue. 136 Penalty-enhancement statutes do not address the beliefs of the
128. United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
845 (1983).
United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 838 (1984),
rejected a challenge to the 1968 Act's ability to reach purely private action. Further-
more, in United States v. Griffin, 585 F..Supp. 1439 (D.N.C. 1983), the District Court of
North Carolina ruled that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
129. 704 F.2d 1183;
130. See id.
131. See Franklin, 704 F.2d at 1188 (quoting United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473,
478-79 (8th Cir. 1981)).
132. Professor Gellman distinguishes the 1968 Act from hate-crime statutes because
federal criminal law does not proscribe the conduct targeted by the 1968 Act if performed
without the discriminatory purpose. See Gellman, supra note 15, at 367-68 n. 161. This
reasoning sidesteps the fact that both types of laws punish the underlying conduct more
harshly when accompanied by such a discriminatory purpose. See infra part III.D. (dis-
cussing this issue as it relates to Title VII).
133. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992) (distinguishing Title
VII from statutes aimed at controlling content of expression).
134. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515).
135. See id. -at 825 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
136. Of course, a statute that criminalized either the hatred of black people, or attacks
committed because of a hatred of blacks would punish the defendant's constitutionally
protected beliefs. For a thorough analysis of freedom of thought and First Amendment
issues, see Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime
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actor, they address the actor's intent - the selection of the victim
because of race.
The punishment of hate crimes is justifiable for the same reasons
that crimes such as burglary are punished.' 37 One reason is that the
conduct addressed by the statute creates a greater societal harm than
is created by the criminal conduct absent the proscribed intent. 38
States punish this conduct because the associated blameworthiness is
considered more extreme. 39 As Justice Bablitch stated in dissent to
Mitchell, "the penalty enhancer statute punishes more severely
criminals who act with what the legislature has determined is a more
depraved, antisocial intent: an intent not just to injure but to inten-
tionally pick out and injure a person because of a person's protected
status. "14
Hate-crime statutes are also justified as a form of deterrence. '4'
Mitchell was looking for a white person to victimize and did so. For
some reason, he believed the perceived benefits of his action out-
weighed the possible detriment. 42 Hate-crime statutes seek to place a
heavier weight on the detriment side of the scale. 43
Penalty-enhancement statutes constitutionally punish hate crimes
because they do not target expression. The selection of victims be-
cause of race demonstrates a blameworthy element of criminal con-
duct, the mens rea. Laws penalizing such conduct bar people from
Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 30-35
(1992).
Professor Martin Redish believes that penalty-enhancement provisions penalize repug-
nant social attitudes, see id. at 38-39; however, his conclusion does not necessarily follow
from the statute's wording. Redish states that enhanced penalties punish the defendants'
motives; he then concludes that the specific motive that is punished is racial hatred. See
id. However, penalty-enhancement statutes address the actor's intent, not beliefs. A per-
son who selects a black assault victim solely on the basis of race may have no bigoted
views at all. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
137. See supra part III.A.
138. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817; id. at 818 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); id. at
830 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (discussing the great harm caused by hate crimes).
139. See supra notes 15-16, 97-111 and accompanying text.
140. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 822 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
141. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence, restraint,
and rehabilitation).
142. Indeed, Mitchell may have acted out of bigotry. The right to be a bigot, however,
does not give him the right to act on his hatred. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807,
825 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515) (Bablitch,
J., dissenting); id. at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Similarly, freedom of speech
rights do not allow employers to voice sexually derogatory fighting words in the work-
place. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
143. Cf BENTHAM, supra note 112, at 329 (stating that "[t]he punishment should be
adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief
there may be a motive to restrain the offender from giving birth to it.")
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injuring others because of race, but they do not infringe on the right
to hate people because of race." Therefore, these statutes do not
violate First Amendment rights.
C. Debunking the Chilled Speech Theory
The Mitchell court stated that people would refrain from expressing
their views for fear of prosecution under the state's penalty-enhance-
ment provision. '45 Racial slurs uttered during the commission of a
crime, however, would not necessarily subject the perpetrator to en-
hanced penalties,' 46 nor would having a history of speaking out about
racial differences. Both circumstances are merely pieces of evidence
to weigh when determining the actor's intent.'47 While in certain in-
stances an actor's words, uttered either concurrent with or prior to
the crime, will be indicative of the intent to injure because of the vic-
tim's race (e.g., shouting "All niggers must die. KKK forever!" while
attacking a black person) and thus a violation of the hate-crime stat-
ute, these occasions do not render the statute unconstitutional.'48
A futile argument, and one that has not been raised, would be that
hate crimes are forms of expression that are free from all punish-
ment. 14 9 Indeed, hate crimes are punishable at least insofar as they
144. See supra note 142.
145. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
146. See Grannis, supra note 118, at 184.
147. See Martin B. Margulies, Intent, Motive, and the R.A. V. Decision, 11 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 42, 44 (1992). The Oregon Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment chal-
lenge to that State's statute, stating that "[s]peech is often used to prove crimes that do
not proscribe speech, particularly the intent element of those crimes .... [B]ut the words
themselves are not an element of the crime .... State v. Plowman, 383 P.2d 558, 565-66
(Or. 1992). A New York court held that the defendant's words are circumstantial evi-
dence that the attack was committed because of the victim's religion. See People v.
Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988).
148. As explained by Justice Bablitch in dissent to Mitchell, "[i]t is no more a chilling
of free speech to allow words to prove the act of intentional selection ... than it is to
allow a defendant's words that he 'hated John Smith and wished he were dead' to prove a
defendant intentionally murdered John Smith." Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 822 (Bablitch,
J., dissenting). The majority opinion countered by arguing that speech was used to show
more than intent; speech was also used to prove the bias. See id. at 814. However, the
words used indicated more than intent and more than bias. They indicated an intentional
selection of the victim because of race. Mitchell asked his friends "'[d]o you all feel
hyped up to move on some white people?'" Id. at 809. When the victim came within
sight, Mitchell directed the group toward the boy and said, " 'There goes a white boy; go
get him.'" Id.
149. One might argue that hate crimes are expressive and that enhanced penalties sup-
press the message component of the crimes. Such an argument is defeated by the United
States Supreme Court's statement in R.A. V that "[w]here the government does not target
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." R.A.V. v. City of St.
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constitute traditionally defined crimes (i.e., the same crime absent the
racial selection of the victim). Furthermore, a perpetrator's racist
comments may be used to prove that he or she acted intentionally.
The United States Supreme Court "has emphasized that an illegal
course of conduct is not protected by the First Amendment merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language." 1 50 Thus, the chilling effect that might arise from
a penalty-enhancement statute has been present to some degree under
the traditional penal system.
The only question, therefore, is whether the additional punishment
rendered by hate-crime statutes would impermissibly affect speech. In
Dawson v. Delaware,"' an analogous context, the United States
Supreme Court dealt with a stipulation that had been introduced at a
capital sentencing hearing. Dawson's stipulation admitted his mem-
bership in a Delaware prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood, and
it described another gang of the same name as having white racist
beliefs. 52 The Court found the evidence irrelevant to the issues at
sentencing,153 and held that its consideration violated the defendant's
First Amendment rights, because "the evidence proved nothing more
than Dawson's abstract beliefs." '54 Racist attitudes had no relevance
to Dawson's crime (Dawson and his victim were both white); there-
fore the stipulation failed to show any aggravating circumstances and
served only to prejudice the jury.1 55
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992); see also State v. Plowman, 383 P.2d 558, 565-66
(Or. 1992) (quoting R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47). Penalty-enhancement statutes target
conduct regardless of any message. See supra part III.B. Therefore, they may control the
use of hate crimes as a means of expression.
Furthermore, the Court stated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968),
that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." For a full discussion of
how an O'Brien analysis would support the constitutionality of penalty-enhancement
statutes, see Grannis, supra note 118, at 216-30.
150. United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)). Daly was convicted of willfully aiding and assisting in the
preparation of false income tax returns. Id. at 1081. The court stated, "the speech Daly
claims is protected was not itself the wrong for which he was convicted, but it was merely
the means by which he committed the crimes of which he was convicted." Id.at 1082.
Similarly, in hate crimes, the speech itself is not the crime. The crime is the act of inten-
tionally injuring because of the victim's race. See supra parts III.A.-B.
151. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
152. Id. at 1097. The stipulation did not include information about the particular
branch of which the defendant was a member.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1098.
155. See id.
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In arriving at its holding, the Court emphasized that "the Constitu-
tion does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence con-
cerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because
those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amend-
ment."' 15 6 Evidence of racial intolerance may be considered at capital
sentencing hearings if relevant to the issues involved. 15 7 For example,
"associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing
that a defendant represents a future danger to society."'5 s Although
Dawson involved sentencing rather than the trial stage of the convic-
tion, its portrayal of First Amendment protection implies that consti-
tutionally sheltered expression can serve as a basis for providing
harsher punishment.
Professor Susan Gellman minimizes the significance of Dawson's
First Amendment description. Drawing an analogy to burglary, she
claims the Court merely condoned a prosecutor's use of evidence to
show that, shortly before the crime, the defendant had been in a syna-
gogue near the crime scene. 5 9 She states that such evidence has al-
ways been admissible for purposes of identification or for proving
intent, but that society could not make one's presence in a synagogue
an element of a criminal offense."6 While this conclusion is correct,
her analogy presents an inaccurate depiction of the issues. In Dawson,
the Court was not concerned about identification or intent; rather, the
issue was blameworthiness and its impact on sentencing. 161 As stated
earlier, one justification of penalty-enhancement laws also concerns
the actor's blameworthiness;162 therefore, Dawson is on point.
The Mitchell court emphasized that considering racist motive at the
sentencing stage differs from adding a separate criminal sentence for
that motive. 163 However, the distinction is one of criminal theory; it
156. Id. at 1097; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) (rejecting a due
process challenge to the introduction of the defendant's racist attitudes at a capital pun-
ishment sentencing). But see Redish, supra note 136, at 37 (characterizing quoted pas-
sage as flawed dictum having no relevance to the constitutionality of penalty-
enhancement statutes).
157. See Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949
(1983), in which the Court permitted racial elements of crimes to be admitted at a capital
sentencing hearing)..
158. Id. at 1098.
159. See Susan Gellman, "Brother, You Can't Go to Jail for What You're Thinking".
Motives, Effects, and "Hate Crime" Laws, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 24, 25-26 (1992).
160. See id. at 26.
161. See supra text accompanying note 158.
162. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
163. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 n.17 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No.. 92-515). The court argues "it is permissible to
consider evil motive or moral turpitude when sentencing for a particular crime, but it is
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does little to explain how the manner of imposing punishment might
affect expression. Since the constitutionally-proscribed "chilling ef-
fect" is a practical consideration of the human response to laws, 164 the
difference between the impact of front-end and back-end attention to
motives would be minor, if present at all. 165 Thus, although penalty-
enhancement statutes might have a chilling effect, that outcome
would be constitutionally permissible.
D. Discriminatory Conduct and Constitutional Penalties
The Mitchell argument would seem to apply to civil anti-discrimi-nation statutes. Such laws prohibit the performance of otherwise
legal conduct if the victim is selected on the basis of race. Since the
underlying conduct carries no penalty, the laws could be character-
ized as penalty-enhancement statutes - they provide harsher punish-
ment than would apply for the underlying conduct alone. The
Mitchell analysis indicates that anti-discrimination statutes target
only the actor's reasons for acting, thereby regulating thought and
violating First Amendment rights. Yet, the Mitchell court came to a
different conclusion when faced with the similarity between the
Wisconsin statute and Title VII. I66
Title VII and state anti-discrimination statutes penalize otherwise
legal conduct if the actor performs such conduct "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'' 67 Mitchell,
however, distinguished Title VII from the hate-crime statute on two
grounds: 1) Title VII punishes an objectively discriminatory act while
the hate-crime statute punishes the actor's subjective motivation; 6 2)
Title VII punishes via civil penalties whereas the hate-crime statute
provided for criminal penalties.169 A' a dissenter pointed out, how-
quite a different matter to sentence for that underlying crime and then add to that crimi-
nal sentence a separate enhancer ... solely to punish the evil motive .... " Id.; see also
Ralph S. Brown, Susan Gellman Has it Right, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 46, 47 (1992).
(stating that sentencing is a "much looser process than guilt determination.").
164. See supra text accompanying note 91.
165. Indeed, hate-crime statutes would give a defendant more warning of, and a
chance to defend against, the implications of his or her actions. In a due process sense,
such effect may be more fair than allowing a judge to consider motives at the sentencing
phase.
166. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816-17 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515) (differentiating between anti-discrimination stat-
utes and penalty-enhancing hate-crime statutes); Gellman, supra note 15, at 367-68. Pro-
fessor Gellman's argument formed the basis for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision.
167. For the specific wording of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, see supra note 49.
168. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816-17; accord State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 456
(Ohio 1992).
169. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817.
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ever, these contentions present a "distinction without a difference."',7
1. Debunking the Objective/Subjective-Conduct Distinction
Title VII operates in the same manner as the hate-crime penalty-
enhancing statute. Both laws proscribe discrimination - one in the
selection of a victim on which to perpetrate a civil wrong, the other in
the selection of a victim on which to perpetrate a criminal wrong. 7'
Title VII enhances the penalty for the ordinarily innocent act of firing
an employee if the firing was done because of the victim's race. Simi-
larly, the hate-crime statute provides harsher punishment for acts
committed because of the victim's race. Two examples help to clarify
the parallel:
Example 1. Lisa fires John because John is black.
Example 2. Lisa kills John because John is black.
Both examples involve injury committed because of the victim's race.
According to the Mitchell court, Title VII as applied to the first
example seeks to punish the objective act of discrimination.' 72 In the
second example, Mitchell held, hate-crime statutes penalize the sub-
jective mental process of selecting a victim rather than an objective
act. 1'3 The court based this distinction on the fact that in the second
example Lisa's act of killing John is illegal even in the absence of a
hate-crime law, whereas the act of firing is legal except under the cir-
cumstances proscribed by Title VII.' 4 This rationale fails to take
into account the relative nature of the punishment given by each type
of statute. Both Title VII and a penalty-enhancement statute increase
the punishment beyond that which would apply if Lisa had not acted
because of race. As dissenting Justice Bablitch succinctly stated:
"How can the Constitution protect discrimination in the performance
of an illegal act and not protect discrimination in the performance of
an otherwise legal act?"' 75 The Constitution does not make this
170. Id. at 823 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 817.
173. Id. at 817. "The hate crimes statute . . . punishes the defendant's motive for
acting .... [The] statute creates nothing more than a thought crime." Id. at 817 n.21.
174. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1992) (No. 92-515); id. at 824 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). Professor
James Weinstein points out that this argument actually favors penalty-enhancement laws,
because they merely use motive to determine the degree of punishment for an illegal act.
Title VII, on the other hand, makes motive the "determinative factor between legality and
illegality." Weinstein, supra note 111, at 14 (emphasis added). Thus, if punishment of
motive would create a free speech problem, Title VII appears to be the greater offender of
the two statutes. Id.
175. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 820 (Bablitch, J. dissenting).
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distinction.
Although the court in Mitchell claimed that Wisconsin's hate-crime
statute was aimed at motive rather than discriminatory acts, 76 the
opinion did not convincingly distinguish the effects of the two laws.
In fact, the court "freely admit[ted] that anti[-]discrimination statutes
are concerned with the actor's motive,"1 77 but perceived such statutes
as redressing the objective conduct taken in respect to the victim, not
the actor's motive.1 78 This argument ignores the fact that the objec-
tive conduct with respect to the victim of discriminatory firing is the
same as the objective conduct with respect to anyone who is fired.
Consequently, Title VII must be concerned with more than the objec-
tive conduct.1 79
Indeed, applying the Mitchell analysis to Example 1 would make
Title VII appear unconstitutional. Parsing Lisa's action shows that
she has 1) performed the permissible act of firing an employee 2) be-
cause that employee is black. The act of firing is not punishable; thus,
the statute penalizes only the actor's-reasons for acting. s° As stated
by the court in reference to a hate-crime statute, the "statute does not
address effects, state of mind, or a change in the character of the [act],
but only the thoughts and ideas that propelled the actor to act."1 81
Since Mitchell concluded that the reason for the actions, or the big-
oted motive, is constitutionally protected,1 1 2 the court's holding im-
plies that Title VII must infringe upon the freedom of thought. Yet,
the Wisconsin court properly conceded that Title VII constitutionally
performs its function. '83
176. See id. at 816-17 (stating that anti-discrimination statutes punish the discrimina-
tory act while hate-crime statutes punish the discriminatory motive of the actor); Gell-
man, supra note 15, at 367-68, 367 n.161.
177. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817 n.21. State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ohio
1992) also stated that anti-discrimination laws require proof of discriminatory motive.
178. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817 n.21.
179. See, e.g., id. at 823 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). Justice Bablitch explains "[i]t is not
... the failure to hire that is being punished [by Title VII], it is the failure to hire because
of status." Id.
180. Cf Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting Gellman, supra note 15, at 363)(arguing
that penalty-enhancing hate-crime statutes punish thoughts).
181. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting Gellman, supra note 15, at 363).
182. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text; Gellman, supra note 15, at 367-68,
363 n.138 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-235 (1977)).
183. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816-817, 816 n.20 (citing Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)). In Hishon, the defendant challenged a Title VII action
on the grounds that it violated the right of freedom of expression. The Supreme Court
answered by stating " '[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form
of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never
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Gellman states that the difference between hate-crime statutes and
anti-discrimination laws is that bigotry is constitutionally protected
while discrimination is not. 84 She uses a double-edged sword to ex-
plain why Title VII is constitutional and hate-crime laws are invalid:
"Just as bigotry can exist without being acted upon, discrimination
can occur without racist motivation."1 85 Yet, as shown above, hate
crimes too can occur without such motivation,18 6 and penalty-en-
hancement laws aim to punish all crimes committed because of the
victim's race. Like Title VII, hate-crime statutes focus on conduct.'8 7
Despite the right to be a bigot, these laws constitutionally proscribe
acts committed on the basis of race.1 88
Title VII permissibly punishes the conduct of discrimination, 89 be-
cause "'the Constitution ... places no value on discrimination.' "190
Penalty-enhancement statutes operate in the same manner as Title
VII. They are both laws against discrimination. 9' Whether re-
dressing acts in the workplace committed because of race, or penaliz-
ing criminal acts committed because of race, both laws prohibit
conduct, not expression.1 92 The penalty-enhancement statute, there-
fore, is constitutional.
been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.'" 467 U.S. at 78 (quoting Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)) (alteration in original).
184. Gellman, supra note 15, at 367-68.
185. Id. at 368. Professor Gellman concedes that not all discrimination is motivated
by racism, and that Title VII is aimed solely at discriminatory actions, not racial motives.
See id.
186. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 120-143 and accompanying text.
188. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515) (Bablitch, J., dissenting) ("The statute does not
... punish the right of persons to have bigoted thoughts or to express themselves in a
bigoted fashion .... What the statute does punish is acting upon those thoughts."); id. at
819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
189. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in R.A. V used Title VII as an example of a
statute that punishes conduct. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546
(1992) (distinguishing Title VII from statutes aimed at controlling content of expression).
The Mitchell court, however, had trouble accepting the argument that Title VII is aimed
at conduct. One part of the opinion acknowledged that Title VII punishes discriminatory
acts. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817 & n.21. Another part of the opinion referred to
Title VII as a "slight incursion into free speech." Id. at 817.
190. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 469 (1972).
191. See Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 925-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
granted, No. 80,580, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 2242 (Fla. Dec. 23, 1992); Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d
at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 171.
192. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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2. Debunking the Civil/Criminal-Penalty Distinction
The Mitchell court also invoked the civil/criminal nature of punish-
ment as a difference that validates Title VII while rendering the
Wisconsin hate-crime statute unconstitutional. 193 The court con-
tended that criminal sanctions chill free speech to a greater extent
than civil penalties do, and that the civil remedies under Title VII are
constitutionally acceptable whereas the criminal sanctions given by
penalty-enhancement laws are intolerable. 94
To the contrary, Professor James Weinstein notes, "the United
States Supreme Court has long recognized that the crucial question in
free speech cases is not the civil or criminal nature of the regulation in
question but whether the regulation in fact prohibits . . . protected
speech."' 95 Furthermore, the Court indicated in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan 96 that civil statutes may have a remarkably greater chil-
ling effect than criminal laws: civil actions do not provide the proce-
dural safeguards that protect defendants under the criminal laws, and
civil law damage awards can greatly exceed the maximum fines that
criminal laws impose.' 97 Thus, the Mitchell court's description of
civil laws and their chilling effect is inaccurate.
Assuming for the sake of argument that penalty-enhancement stat-
utes do chill speech, the implication arises that Title VII and the 1968
Act, which operate in the same manner, would have the same ef-
fect. 198 The Mitchell court's conclusion, therefore, would make the
nation's body of civil rights legislation appear invalid. 19  "[R] ather
than there being some fatal First Amendment flaw in our nation's
basic civil rights laws," Professor Weinstein argues, "it is more likely
that the fault lies with Gellman's [and the Mitchell court's] First
Amendment analysis.""
Even assuming that the Wisconsin court was correct about the chil-
ling effect differential between civil and criminal penalties, the court's
193. See id. at 817 (stating, "there is a difference between the civil penalties imposed
under Title VII and other anti[-]discrimination statutes and the criminal penalties im-
posed by the hate[-]crimes law ....") Furthermore, the court expressed a belief that an
anti-discrimination statute that criminalized only an employer's subjective discrimination
would be unconstitutional. See id.
194. See id. The court cited no case law to support this contention.
195. Weinstein, supra note 111, at 15 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964)).
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
198. Weinstein, supra note 111, at 15.
199. See id.
200. James Weinstein, Some Further Thoughts on "Thought Crimes", 11 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 61, 63 n.10 (1992).
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analysis fails to account for the arguments favoring proportionality of
punishment. Proportionality theories provide for increasing the se-
verity of punishment to match the egregiousness of the act. 20 1 As
stated by H.L.A. Hart, the "principles of justice or fairness ... re-
quire morally distinguishable offenses to be treated differently. 20
2
Title VII applies civil penalties, but it applies them only to civil in-
fractions (e.g., discriminatory firing). Penalty-enhancement statutes,
on the other hand, employ criminal penalties in response to criminal
acts (e.g., discriminatory assault). The nature of the offenses targeted
by penalty-enhancement statutes justifies the use of criminal
sanctions.
Proportionality of punishment would, in any event, justify en-
hanced penalties for discriminatory crimes. Such justification is un-
necessary, however, because the analogous structure and effect
between penalty-enhancement laws and the constitutionally sound
Title VII implies that the former are valid. The argument that the
First Amendment will not countenance criminal penalties in hate-
crime statutes fails.
IV. Penalty Enhancement and "Fighting Words":
A Proposed Statute
In R.A. V., the Supreme Court stated that a law aimed at control-
ling conduct may legitimately restrict sub-categories of fighting
words. As an example, the Court described Title VII's impact on sex-
ually derogatory fighting words.20 3 Although R.A. V disallowed di-
rect control of expressive content, even when the expression took the
form of proscribable fighting words, the Court recognized that valid
laws sometimes affect speech.2°
Using Title VII as a pattern for a penalty-enhancement statute,
20 5
a state may regulate fighting words and still avoid conflicting with
R.A. V 2 6 A sample statute could read as follows:20 7
201. See supra part III.A. (discussing purposes of penalizing blameworthy conduct).
202, H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 36-37 (1963), reprinted in KAD-
ISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 97, at 332.
203, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992); see also supra, part II.A.
204. See supra text accompanying note 51.
205. In both statutes, the law seeks to punish the conduct of discrimination - a per-
missible goal. See supra part III.D.
206. But see Redish, supra note 136, at 38. Professor Redish claims that penalty-en-
hancement statutes suffer from the same defect as the ordinance rejected by the Supreme
Court in R.A. V - they are under-inclusive. See id. His argument is premised on the
belief that penalty enhancement affects only criminals whose acts are motivated by preju-
dice. See id. The actor's beliefs, however, are not addressed by these hate-crime statutes.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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(1) It shall be unlawful for a person intentionally to menace or
voice fighting words to an individual because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(2) For the purposes of par. (1), the terms menace and fighting
words are defined to mean conduct that itself inflicts injury or
tends to incite immediate violence.
(3) Any person found guilty under par. (1) shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the criminal liabil-
ity should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed
for the commission of menacing).2 °s
Like Title VII, the proposed statute targets conduct. The difference
between this provision and the ordinance in R.A. V becomes apparent
upon dissection of the crime into its elements of actus reus and mens
rea. The actus reus would be the utterance of the fighting words. The
statute does not prohibit any specific sub-category of fighting words,
nor does it make an impermissible distinction regarding symbolism,
specific words, or any other content-based aspect of expression. 2°9
The mens rea of the crime would be intent (as specified in the statute).
Furthermore, the prosecution would have to prove that the actor in-
tended to menace the victim because of the victim's race. 210 While
speech is probative of intent,21' this element does not prohibit any
207. The proposed statute uses the definition of "fighting words" given in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that conduct or expression that
itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence is not protected by First Amend-
ment). It also includes menacing, which is already a crime in many states. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.15 (McKinney 1987) (menacing in the third degree).
The model proposed in this Note does not prohibit acts committed because of the
perceived race of the victim. The word "perceived" has been included in some laws, see,
e.g., WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1992), to penalize actors whose conduct fits the criminal defi-
nition but whose victim was not in fact of the race, 'religion, etc. that the actor believed
him to be. Despite the possible deterrent effect such a statute might have, the problems
associated with proving an actor's perceptions could make the law difficult to enforce.
208. The ADL model statute suggests a punishment that is one degree more serious
than that imposed for the underlying offense. See supra note 71. This Note's proposal
mirrors that recommendation.
This punishment is hardly unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that sentence length invokes a substantive
penal judgment that, as a general matter, lies "'properly within the province of legisla-
tures, not courts.'" Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2703 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting with approval Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980)); cf.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (acknowledging the principle of deference to
legislative judgments, while finding an Eighth Amendment defect in a life sentence with
no possibility of parole for a repeat offender guilty only of petty property crimes).
209. For an explanation of the constitutional problems presented by sub-categorizing
otherwise proscribable categories of expression, see supra part II.A.
210. See supra part III.B.
211. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 823 (Wis.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3431
(U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (No. 92-515) (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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sub-category of fighting words.
Using an example of two Skinheads will help clarify this point. If,
while attacking Skinhead Y, Skinhead X calls Y a "damned Jew," the
speech may be used to prove that X acted intentionally.212 The
epithet would be offensive to people based on their religion, thus it
would violate the ordinance in R.A. V The remark also shows that X
harbors bigoted beliefs. Assuming, however, that Y is not Jewish and
that X knew this, the words would not prove that X attacked Y be-
cause of Y's religion. No prosecution could be initiated under the
proposed statute.
To take this example one step further, assume Skinhead Y yelled to
a Jewish person, "You bastard, I'll shave your head and make you
respectable!" These words could be characterized as fighting words,
yet they do not convey a message that would be offensive because of
the race or religion of the victim. If the Skinhead uttered the fighting
words because of the victim's religion, the Skinhead would have vio-
lated the model statute. The statute punishes discriminatory conduct
regardless of the message.213
By aiming at conduct rather than expression, state legislatures can
control some forms of hate speech. The model statute allows states to
prohibit verbal attacks that occur because of the victim's race. Thus,
if a Klansman menaces or assaults an African-American because she
is black, and calls her a "nigger," the Klansman would contravene the
statute. The violation is based on the Klansman's conduct - the
menacing because of race - rather than on the content of the expres-
sion. Although the expression may be used circumstantially to prove
the Klansman's intent, this does not constitute an impermissible con-
tent distinction in violation of the First Amendment.21 4 Control of a
sub-category of fighting words is permissible because the statute's goal
is to control conduct.
V. Conclusion
Bias crime continues to be a significant problem in our nation. Its
occurrence stems not only from organized hate groups, but also from
the prejudices that exist throughout society. While, the First Amend-
212. This may seem to be a far-fetched example, but a Skinhead probably believes such
a name to be slanderous. The epithet, if intended to inflame the recipient, might have
succeeded.
213. See supra parts III.A.-B.; Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Bablitch explains that hate-crime statutes punish the act of selecting the
victim whether or not the selection is motivated by racial hatred. See id. at 824-25 (Bab-
litch, J., dissenting).
214. See supra part II.A.
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ment gives us the freedom to form opinions and to be bigots, that
freedom does not give us the right to injure others because of their
race, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or any other
characteristic. Legislators have attempted to stem such violence by
punishing the perpetrators more severely than other criminals. Pen-
alty-enhancement statutes, in this context, provide a valid means to
punish conduct.
Such provisions are comparable to existing anti-discrimination stat-
utes, which have been declared constitutional. Moreover, penalty-en-
hancement laws resemble federal criminal statutes that punish acts
committed because of the victim's race. A hate-crime law modeled
after either of these sources should survive a First Amendment chal-
lenge, as each of these laws is directed at the actor's intent, not at
racial attitudes. Applying a penalty-enhancement statute to two ex-
amples should clarify this point: if a bigot attacks a black passer-by
solely to steal money, she cannot be prosecuted under the hate-crime
law; by contrast, if a racially-indifferent person attacks a black to im-
press her racist friends, she has the intent to injure him because of his
race. This attack contravenes the statute.
Penalty-enhancement statutes target criminal conduct, not
thoughts. They address the actor's mental culpability by requiring
proof that he selected the victim on the basis of race or other statuto-
rily protected category. By focusing on intent rather than beliefs,
such laws avoid a conflict with First Amendment rights.
Kevin N. Ainsworth
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